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Abstract 
This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new 
empirical EU-based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market 
adjustment. While the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous, attention shifted 
recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements. As a consequence, 
the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and 
identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels. While 
empirical evidence does no show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of 
the Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the euro, the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour 
market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and 
increasing labour market adjustment  
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  11.  INTRODUCTION 
The variation of labour market responses to common shocks across industrialised 
countries in the late 1970 and early 1980s has been widely documented. While in some 
countries those shocks led to only a temporary deterioration in their unemployment prospects, 
others saw high and persistent unemployment even when the shocks faded away. This 
differentiated performance suggests the existence of country-specific structural factors, which 
may influence the responses to common shocks. Similarly, the sharp fall in unemployment 
observed in several euro area countries since the second half of the 1990s is considered by 
many observers to be structural, since it occurred with no signs of price and wage inflation 
(Decressin et al. 2001, Garibaldi and Mauro 2002). This differentiated improvement across 
Europe may be related to the specific pace at which labour market reforms were introduced in 
this period.  
These differences in unemployment dynamics are captured by the coefficient of variation 
(Figure 2 in Annex). All countries saw the unemployment rate pick up in response to the 
common supply shocks recorded in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and this can be seen in the 
decline in the coefficient of variation. Some countries (such as Austria, Sweden, Norway, 
Japan or Switzerland) reacted much better than other countries (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Belgium, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, France, Canada or the US), as they registered a much smaller 
increase in their unemployment rate in the mid-80s. In the subsequent period of the economic 
recovery in the late 1980s, some countries with above average unemployment (France and 
Italy) recorded a further increase in their unemployment rate, while a few countries with 
better starting positions saw some improvement in their labour market (Germany, Portugal, 
Sweden, Finland).
1 As a consequence of these differentiated reactions, the coefficient of 
variation went up. The employment crisis of the first half of the 1990s, which hit all countries 
except Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, attenuated the differences in the 
unemployment rate pattern across countries. In the second half of the 1990s, the coefficient of 
variation continued to fall, suggesting that the improvement observed in the EU 
unemployment rate was particularly marked in countries with relatively high unemployment 
rates. However, despite the decline in the unemployment rate in many member states, the 
                                                 
1 The sharp reduction in the unemployment in Spain and Ireland in the second half of the 1980s remains modest 
in relative terms, as the unemployment rate in these two countries is still the highest by far in the European 
Union at the end of the 1980s.  
  2heterogeneity of unemployment remains so high that ‘talking about “European 
unemployment” is misleading’ (Blanchard 2005). 
Although explanations of these different unemployment behaviours abound in the 
economic literature (see Blanchard 2005 for a review), there is a growing consensus about the 
key importance of labour market institutions in influencing labour market performance. 
Observing the different reactions of unemployment in the mid-1980s, Bruno and Sachs (1985) 
started to investigate the potential impact of institutions (and in particular collective 
bargaining characteristics) on economic performance. They related the differences in 
economic and labour market performance (low inflation, low unemployment rates, high 
employment rates) to the interaction between country-specific bargaining structures (partly 
captured by a corporatism index) and common supply shocks.  Eichengreen and Iversen 
(1999) argue that, in order to initiate and sustain economic growth, labour market institutions 
should be able to adapt to rapidly changing production technologies and an increasingly 
heterogeneous labour force, and that the failure to introduce institutional reforms that could 
overcome collective-action problems in the labour market is considered as one reason for the 
poor labour market performance. Similarly, Blanchard (2005) refers to the poor fit between 
labour market institutions and the macroeconomic environment as the main characteristic of 
the evolution of the French labour market since the Second World War. More generally, 
economic institutions are important because they affect the structure of economic incentives 
in society (Acemoglu 2005).  
The interest in labour market institutions has not been limited to academic work. Since 
the launch of the OECD Job Strategy and the EU European Employment Strategy, there has 
also been a growing consensus amongst policy makers that the “rules of game” of the labour 
market need to be adapted to new challenges such as demographic ageing, fast technological 
changes and rapid swings in the international division of labour. This is a crucial condition for 
reaping the benefits of a changing socioeconomic environment and avoiding its potential 
pitfalls. 
The positive performance of countries that have reformed their labour market institutions 
shows that one-size-fits-all reforms cannot respond effectively to labour market problems. 
Many observers emphasise that the whole configuration of labour market institutions in a 
given country must be considered before they are reformed and, more fundamentally, that the 
design of labour market reforms is a key determinant of their success.  
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literature on labour market institutions. While the literature traditionally treats labour market 
institutions as exogenous, attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying 
causes of specific institutional arrangements. Understanding the genesis of institutions is often 
a precondition for reforming them. Section 2 highlights the new strand of literature presenting 
the institutions as the outcome of an endogenous process. Section 3 stresses the role of 
interactions involving labour market institutions in explaining labour market performance. As 
a consequence, the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design 
exploiting these interactions wisely. Section 4 identifies general principles for achieving an 
efficient policy design at macro level through well-functioning bargaining institutions and the 
promotion of policy packages. Section 5 spells out the principles to attain an efficient policy 
design at the micro level. Section 6 presents some new empirical evidence based both on the 
FRDB database and on various panel analyses using the recent LABREF database on labour 
market reforms. While evidence does no show a major change in terms of intensity of labour 
market reform after the setting of the Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the 
euro, the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of fragile groups 
tended to have been successful in both raising their employment prospect and increasing 
labour market adjustment. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AS THE OUTCOME OF AN ENDOGENOUS PROCESS 
The economic literature tended to take institutions as given, treating them as purely 
exogenous. But a new branch of research is now attempting to better understand their 
formation as the result of endogenous processes. The question is therefore why labour market 
institutions are as they are, and to what extent the current configuration of labour market 
institutions might be desirable despite their sometimes unfavourable impact on labour market 
performance.  
For instance, there has been a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the drivers 
of collectives bargaining institutions (e.g. the degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining) since the seminal work by Wallace and Kahn (1982) and Katz (1993). Schnabel et 
al. (2006) show that more or less the same set of variables play a statistically significant role 
in explaining the structure of collective bargaining in Britain and in Germany. These are 
establishment size, establishment age, foreign ownership, public sector affiliation and being a 
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large, foreign owned or operate in financial services desire the largest role for local bargaining 
in contract wage increase, while employees resist local bargaining, except when the firm uses 
performance-related pay. 
Broadly speaking there are four basic but non-mutually exclusive views: The legal theory 
contends that labour market institutions and regulations are related to the historical origins of 
national laws. According to the social conflict view, institutions do not represent the interest 
of the society at large but rather that of groups that shape institutions in ways that maximise 
their own rents, while they could be by themselves a source of rents. According to the 
efficient institution view, institutions are chosen efficiently by weighing their social costs 
against their benefits. Lastly, the second-best approach to imperfect institutional 
configuration claims that the combination of institutions might be the result of second best 
equilibrium in the context of “inefficient” markets or in absence of corrective public 
mechanisms.  
2.1 Legal theory 
The legal theory contends that labour market institutions and regulation are related to the 
historical origins of a country’s laws (Botero et al. 2003). Common law countries rely more 
on contracts and private litigation to deal with market failures while civil law rely principally 
on the direct intervention of the government in the regulation of markets. Moreover, this view 
predicts that common law countries should have less generous unemployment benefits 
because they tend to rely more on markets to provide insurance against labour market risks.
2 
2.2 The social conflict view 
According to the social conflict view, it is not the interest of society that institutions 
represent, but rather that of groups that mould institutions in ways that maximise their own 
rents. Hence, institutions do not necessarily coincide with a policy configuration that 
maximise total surplus. Anything that raises average wages and reduces the likelihood of 
dismissal will benefit typical labour market ‘insiders’, probably on permanent contracts and 
                                                 
2 The evidence supports this view. Among the EU15 countries, the UK has the lowest expenditure on 
unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP (0.3%), though the evidence is not conclusive as, for example, 
Greece and Italy follow the UK with respectively 0.4% and 0.6%. In addition, although income redistribution 
through unemployment benefits is limited in Anglo-Saxon countries, they have developed alternative ways to 
provide insurance and income redistribution.  
  5well-represented by labour unions (see Lindbeck and Snower 1988). According to this view, 
institutions introduce a wedge between labour supply and labour demand, interfere with 
labour market relocation, distort relative price and reduce employers’ ability to make 
adjustments at the intensive and extensive margin in the face of unexpected shocks. By 
impeding wage decompression and mobility they limit the possibility of improving workers’ 
welfare and production efficiency. In terms of labour supply, institutions that drive a wedge 
between utility maximising outcomes and socially efficient outcomes create disincentives to 
labour market participation and mobility which ultimately lead to higher unemployment.  In 
terms of labour demand, when workers do not adjust their wage claims, an increase in 
employers’ funded social benefit will increase labour costs and reduce employment. 
3 
In the literature on economic institutions two versions of this view, with different 
implications for the reform strategies to follow, can be identified. The first version considers 
institutions to be largely shaped in practice by the political power of political groups 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005). Although endogenous, not all groups will prefer the same set of 
institutions. Indeed, different institutions entail a change in the distribution of resources which 
is a cause of conflict of interest between different groups over the choice of certain 
institutions. This conflict is likely to arise when there are rents that can be extracted by the 
group with political power that will try to shape institutions accordingly to this task. Hence 
economic institutions are developed to facilitate the appropriation of existing rents by certain 
groups. This implies that labour market institutions that keep the conflict of interest under 
control are likely to emerge when rents are low. Reducing rents in the good markets reduces 
workers’ incentives to fight for a share of these rents (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003) and 
increases the positive effects of the wage moderation on the unemployment rate (Estevao 
2005). Sub-optimal outcomes are also the result of contracting problems when policy makers 
represent only narrow interests (i.e. reforms are not comprehensive) or are unable to make 
commitments that constrain future actions (Castanheira and Esfahani 2003), or when product 
market reforms are not sufficiently widespread (Boeri 2003). Moreover, the distribution of 
power can change over time and institutions that work efficiently under certain conditions are 
unsuitable in a different environment.  
                                                 
3 This is likely to occur when workers do not feel the link between taxes or social contributions paid by them and 
their current and future benefits they are entitled to receive.  
  6The second view considers institutions themselves a source of rents (Saint Paul, 2000).
4  
The existence of rent-creating institutions creates opportunities to develop rent-protecting 
institutions. And the less competitive the labour and product markets, the lower the turnover 
and labour mobility, and the higher the gap between the productivity of skilled and unskilled 
workers, the higher these opportunities are. The complementarity between rent-creating and 
rent-protecting institutions explains why certain institutions come together (e.g. wage 
compression and strict employment protection regulation) while there is an under-provision of 
others (e.g. unemployment benefits). The presence of a status-quo bias is reinforced by such 
complementarities which make reform difficult, if not impossible, without breaking up the 
status quo. The viability of reform is therefore strictly dependent upon the job prospects of 
those that, because of a particular institutional setting, are excluded from the redistribution. 
Improving their employment chances may win their support against the constituency of the 
insiders. Hence, reforms that preserve the status of the insider introducing more flexible 
arrangements for the outsiders (for example, by liberalising temporary contracts without 
addressing labour market regulation for other employees, or by introducing pension reforms 
that apply only to ‘new entrants to the labour force’), although marginal, may reduce the 
influence of the insiders and help change the status quo (Boeri 2003)
5. However, partial 
labour market reforms may lead to a higher turnover of low productivity entry-level jobs, 
longer spells in unemployment, lower welfare and lower overall productivity (Blanchard and 
Landier 2002), which risks putting the economic system on an adjustment path converging 
toward a two-tier system equilibrium.  
2.3 The efficient institutions view 
According to the third view, institutions are chosen efficiently by weighing their social 
costs against their benefits. Hence, different institutional settings may be efficient ways of 
dealing with market failures in certain circumstances but not in others (Blank and Freeman 
1993, Blanchard 2002, Botero et al. 2003). Societal preferences respond to shocks and are 
shaped by how these shocks interact with capital market imperfections that constrain access to 
                                                 
4 In Saint Paul (2000) labour market institutions, such as minimum wage, employment protection laws and 
collective agreements, arise as a politico-economic equilibrium from a redistributive conflict between skilled 
workers on the one hand and low- and medium-skilled workers on the other, and between those in employment 
and those excluded from redistribution (the unemployed).  
5 This reform strategy is not viable for product market reforms because of the strong opposition of the 
incumbents which is counterbalanced by the pressure of the population (consumers) for more competitive 
product markets (Boeri, 2003).  
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because they modify the structure of economic incentives.  
In a perfect competitive model, institutions distort incentives, generate inefficient 
outcomes and are clearly suboptimal. However, because of imperfect and asymmetric 
information in capital markets, allocation in laissez-faire economies is far from the optimal 
outcome predicted by the textbook version of competitive markets. The consequences of 
incomplete insurance markets have been explored in the cases of redistributive taxation 
(Varian 1980), the determination of efficient unemployment insurance with matching frictions 
(Acemoglu and Shimer 1999), redistributive social policies (Benabou 2000), employment 
protection (Bertola 2004; Bertola and Keoniger 2004), and institutions narrowing the wage 
distribution (Agell 2002). Taken together these studies suggest that when capital markets are 
incomplete and/or when workers are risk-averse, certain institutional configurations can 
improve the social welfare.  
When considering insurance arguments, the benefits of insurance should be weighed 
against the cost of reduced efficiency and, possibly, of higher unemployment. Although 
labour market institutions entail information costs and deadweight losses, they can also be 
welfare-improving when markets are imperfect and incomplete. Institutions such as 
unemployment benefits and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) are motivated by the 
desire of credit-constrained risk-averse agents to protect their consumption from income 
volatility, even though consumption smoothing can occur at the expense of production 
efficiency and low employment
6. The insurance element of these institutions also interacts 
with their rent-seeking dimension, which reduces the cost of non-employment (because of 
replacement incomes) and makes the wage distribution more compressed and stable at the 
cost of low employment rates. This adverse effect of wage compression is especially 
pronounced for those with high labour supply elasticity (young workers and women with 
children) or facing high labour demand elasticity (the youth, the low skilled and other 
disadvantage groups such as the migrants). However, a high level of social insurance can be 
consistent with low unemployment and high participation as long as it is provided efficiently 
and yields the proper (financial and non financial) incentives to remain employed. This is 
shown by the experience of the Nordic Countries (Andersen et al. 2007).  The high 
                                                 
6 The higher wages for those remaining employed and financing the income of non-employed individuals have a 
first order effect on the welfare of risks-averse workers who prefer to smooth consumption inter-temporally 
across different states of the world (Bertola and Keoniger 2004 and Bertola 2004). 
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seems puzzling if one discards the effective and powerful role of the non-financial incentives. 
In fact, the distortions created by the high (marginal) tax rates could be undone (or reduced) 
by imposing conditionalities and eligibility conditions (i.e. tight non-economic incentives). 
Notwithstanding the high financial disincentives, the employment conditionalities linked to 
tax, benefits and transfers (both monetary and in kind) increase the value of the time lost to 
claim these benefits, which reduces the reservation wage and boosts the labour supply. This 
means that the net of benefits tax rate goes to zero, which explains the high participation rate 
(Andersen 2009). 
2.4 The second best view: rationale for “inefficient” configuration of institutions  
When taking a second-best view and a comprehensive perspective, some institutions - 
inefficient on their own - might prove to be welfare-improving if combined with other 
inefficient institutions. The trade-off between unemployment benefits and EPL in the 
provision of insurance against labour market risks is the most documented example (e.g. Buti 
et al. 1998, Boeri et al. 2003) of how a welfare improving configuration of labour market 
institutions can depend in real economies on the characteristics of financial markets (Bertola 
and Koeniger 2004)
7, the frequency and nature (sectoral or aggregate) of labour demand 
shocks, the structural characteristics of the economy
8 and the efficiency of collective social 
insurance schemes. Figure 4 displays a slightly different version of this trade-off from the one 
commonly documented. On the horizontal axis the figure reports the expenditure on 
unemployment benefits per unemployed divided by the GDP per capita. This measure 
indicates the proportion of GDP per capita allocated to unemployment benefits per 
unemployed person. The rate of substitutions between these two institutions is negatively 
related to the extent individuals can self-insure against unemployment risks by accessing a 
developed financial market (e.g. Bertola 2004, Boeri et al. 2003) and to the existence of other 
instruments of insurance and income re-distribution. The degree of substitution between EPL 
and unemployment benefits becomes lower if individuals can insure themselves against 
                                                 
7 The authors show that there is a significant correlation between EPL and borrowing constraints, which is related to the attractiveness of 
institutions reducing labour income fluctuations in countries where under-developed financial systems reduce consumption-smoothing 
opportunities. 
8 For example, Hassler et al. (2001) argue that less mobile workers acquire more specialised skills and prefer more generous unemployment 
insurance. The negative relationship between the mobility rate and unemployment insurance is strongly supported by the data. On average 
high mobility countries are characterised by low unemployment insurance while low mobility countries have the most generous 
unemployment insurance system (Hassler et al. 2001). At the same time generous unemployment benefits make specialised workers more 
selective, since they have more to lose from switching to a different job, which increases the proportion of specialised workers and reduces 
heir mobility. The prevalence of sector-specific shocks endogenously raises the need for unemployment insurance and is associated with a 
relatively high unemployment rate and rate of specialisation.  
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which have a lower level of EPL and unemployment benefit than the EU average, have been 
excluded, as they offered a wide access to a developed financial market as an alternative to 
EPL and unemployment benefit. A negative and statistically significant (at 90%) relationship 
is found in Table 4 with a pairwise coefficient of determination of 0.5. 
The substitution between these two institutions can be related to the form of redistributive 
policies. The choice of redistributive institutions that smooth out unemployment risks hinges 
upon the efficiency of both market (e.g. bank credits, special insurance contract against job 
loss) and non-market mechanism (e.g. guaranteed minimum income or social safety nets) in 
delivering such redistribution. When redistribution policies are less efficiently managed 
through taxes and subsidies, insurance against income risks is usually provided via strong 
employment protection legislation. Figure 5 is suggestive of this nexus between the equalising 
properties of redistributive policies and the intensity of labour market regulation provided by 
employment protection legislation. It suggests a strong negative relationship between 
redistribution of tax/benefits and EPL. The pairwise coefficient of determination between the 
EPL and the redistributive effects of the tax/benefit system is 0.7, which is statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence interval. Hence, more redistributive tax/benefit systems 
have less strict EPL. Similarly tight employment protection legislation is associated with a 
relatively low reduction in income inequality reached through the tax and benefit system. 
 
3.  THE ROLE OF INTERACTION INVOLVING LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN EXPLAINING 
LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE  
This section considers the direct and indirect impacts of labour market institutions on 
labour market performances, as identified in the empirical literature. During the 1990s there 
has been a wealth of studies focussing on the effects of institutions on employment 
performance. The main results of some recent studies, often cited, are summarised in Table 1 
at the end of the paper. Among these, three main strands may be identified. Some studies 
concentrated on the role of institutions, others focussed on the interaction between shocks and 
institutions. More recent analyses insisted on the complementarities between institutions and 
on the effects of institutions on relative wages and on relative employment performance. As a 
consequence of the importance of complementarities and interactions, the empirical literature 
cannot reach any full consensus on the role of each institution. 
  103.1 Direct impacts of labour market institutions 
In a first set of studies indicators of labour market institutions are used to explain 
differences across-country in unemployment rates (Layard and Nickell 1999) or the evolution 
of unemployment over time in a panel of OECD countries (Elmeskov et al. 1998). 
Unemployment is positively associated with generous unemployment benefits, high tax 
wedge, and high union coverage and negatively associated with active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) and high co-ordination of bargaining. The role of employment protection legislation 
and union density is uncertain. However, a large part of the change in structural 
unemployment remained unexplained. One major difficulty encountered by these studies is 
that indicators of labour market institutions are only slowly time varying, i.e. certain 
institutions were already in place in the 1960s in many EU countries when European 
unemployment was lower than in the US.  
Nickell et al. (2003) propose a model where changes in institutions explain the evolution 
over time of the unemployment level and shift in the Beveridge curve both alone and when 
interacted with variables representing aggregate demand shocks, productivity shocks and 
wage shocks. The benefit duration, union density and low mobility shift the Beveridge curve 
outward (which implies higher equilibrium unemployment), while employment protection 
shifts it inward. When they turn to explaining unemployment, the generosity of the system of 
unemployment benefits (both in terms of levels and duration) and labour taxes increase 
unemployment, although in the latter this happens to a lesser extent in countries with co-
ordinated wage bargaining (i.e. the interaction between the tax wedge and the degree of 
coordination has a coefficient which declines the more coordinated is bargaining). These 
studies focus on the time variation in the data controlling for country fixed effects and differ 
from the first generation study which use cross country analysis (Nickell 1997). 
Rather than dealing with unemployment behaviour, Mourre (2006) focuses on the impact 
of labour market institutions on employment growth. In particular, he tests a break in 
employment equation for OECD countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s and relates the 
structural break (or absence of such a break) across countries to changes in labour market 
institutions and active labour market policies (along with the change in sectoral structure). 
The countries experiencing a (positive) change in their employment pattern since the late 
1990s are mainly concentrated in the euro area. Among the relevant institutional factors likely 
to have contributed to rising aggregate employment in the euro area in recent years are the 
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stringent employment protection legislation and greater subsidies to private employment. 
Gomez et al (2004) use annual information on firm level data to study the effects of 
institutions on job flows in Europe controlling for the impact of firms characteristics. The 
empirical analysis suggests that countries with tight workers’ protection laws (employment 
protection legislation or EPL) have relatively low job reallocation and job creation rates, 
while the effect on the job destruction rate is statistically insignificant. The duration of 
unemployment benefits and the degree of co-ordination of wage bargaining reduce job flows 
while the effect of the tax wedge is significant only in the case of the job reallocation and the 
job creation rate. Finally, employment subsidies dampen the job creation and the job 
destruction rate while the effect on the job reallocation rate is insignificant. 
Focusing on the new European Union member states and using recent data, Fialová and 
Schneider (2008) confirm that high taxes increase unemployment, while active labour market 
policies tend to reduce it. More stringent employment protection and higher taxes weigh down 
on the participation rate and the employment rate. Moreover, there seems to be a difference in 
the institutional effects between "old" and "new" EU member states. 
3.2 The interactions between labour market institutions and macroeconomic shocks 
A second group of studies tries to reconcile the role of institutions with labour market 
performance focusing on the interactions between labour market institutions and 
macroeconomic shocks. The essence of these studies is that transitory increases in 
unemployment due to shocks may be prolonged by labour market institutions that restrict 
labour market flows and protract the adjustment of real wages. For instance, in their 
influential paper Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) show that macroeconomic shocks explain the 
average rise in the unemployment rates but that institutional variables account for the cross-
country variation in the unemployment rates. Economic shocks explain the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the unemployment rates levels only when interacted with labour market 
institutions. The empirical analysis suggests that the countries with long-lasting 
unemployment benefits, high employment protection or little co-ordination of bargaining 
experience longer periods of high unemployment rates. The basic idea of this and other 
studies conducted in this vein (e.g. Fitoussi et al. 2000, Bertola et al. 2002a) is that certain 
institutions protract the adjustment of wages to temporary shocks and prolong their effects on 
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lasting one. Although employment performance is driven by shocks, the cross-country 
heterogeneity in such performance is related to different degrees of real wage adjustment 
which tend to be influenced by the labour market institutions in place.  
An alternative view on the sources of unemployment has been explored by Ljungqvist 
and Sargent (1998). They argue that in period of economic turbulences there is a higher 
probability of skills deterioration. When shocks requiring a restructuring of the economy 
occur, jobs destroyed in mature sectors should be replaced by jobs in new sectors where “new 
skills” will be accumulated. When incentives to participate are distorted, for example because 
of generous unemployment benefits or long benefit duration, laid-off workers will not accept 
a reallocation and there can be a phase during the transition where unemployment goes up. 
The longer is the unemployment spell, the higher the risks of skills’ depreciation and the 
longer the unemployment duration. The analysis is in line with the view that incoherence 
between labour market institutions and the economic environment gives rise to high 
equilibrium unemployment.  
Nickell et al (2005) explore how much of unemployment patterns can be explained by 
changes in the institutions alone and the additional gains from extending the analysis to the 
interactions between shocks and institutions. Changes in time-varying institutions provide a 
part of explanation of long-term unemployment shifts in the OECD countries - about 55% of 
the 6.8 percentage points increase in the unemployment rate in OECD European countries 
between 1960 and 1995- while the interaction between shocks, captured as in Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) with time dummies, does not add very much to the explanation of the 
unemployment rates.
9 Bassanini and Duval (2006) run similar analysis but use more recent 
data (going up to 2003). They also split the tax wedge between labour taxes and consumption 
taxes. Their results are close to those of Nickell et al (2005). 
3.3 The interactions between labour market institutions themselves
  
A third strand of important studies looks at interactions between different labour market 
institutions. Coe and Snower (1997) argued theoretically that a wide range of institutions may 
have complementary effects on unemployment. A simple description of importance of 
                                                 
9 The use of time dummies to capture shocks makes the implicit assumption that shocks have been the same 
across countries but exert different effects on each country. 
  13complementarities is taken from Belot and Van Ours (2004). In a standard model of imperfect 
competition, unions and firms bargain over the wage (right-to-manage model) to maximise 
their relative rents. Once wages are set firms decide how much workers to hire. In equilibrium 
labour market institutions determines workers’ relative bargaining position. The standard 
labour demand and wage curve could be written: L
d=g(ω,Ψ) with gω<0; ω=h(L,Θ) with hL>0, 
ω the wage rate, Ψ and Θ representing institutional parameters such as ALMPs, UB, EPL, 
minimum wage, etc. It can be shown that the net effect of a change in institutions on 
employment:  








where χ is a set of common institutional variables affecting both labour demand and labour 
supply. In this model, reforms influence employment through three effects. A labour demand 
shifting effect captured by the derivative gχ, a bargaining shifting effect represented by 
an adjustment effect  that depends on the slope of labour supply and labour 
demand. Conditional to a specific institutional configuration, countries can be ranked 
according to the effects of institutions on employment. For the purpose of illustration, a 
decrease in the unemployment benefit replacement rate shifts the wage curve downwards by 
lowering the reservation wage. However, because of the hypothesis of convex decreasing 
returns to labour affecting labour demand, this increase will have a stronger (positive) effect 
on employment in low- tax countries than in high tax countries (Figure 3)
χ ωh g L h gω
10.  
Bertola and Rogerson (1997) find that “despite the stringent dismissal restrictions in most 
European countries, rates of job creation and job destruction are remarkably similar in across 
European and North American labour markets”. This similarity, notwithstanding significantly 
different labour market institutions, does not remain unexplained when one looks at the 
configuration of labour market institutions as a whole. In a model of competitive behaviour 
on the part of employers and workers but with mobility decisions costly for workers, the 
intensity of relocation in labour markets with low firing costs and low wage compression 
(resulting from highly decentralised wage-setting) is similar to that of labour markets with 
high firing costs and high wage compression (as a result of highly centralised wage-setting). 
                                                 
10 The assumption in this textbook example is that in countries where taxes are high, the wage curve is shifted 
upwards as the wage-earners tries to recoup the loss of purchasing power. Therefore, with an unchanged labour 
demand, the equilibrium is shifted leftward along the labour demand curve, resulting in higher wages and lower 
employment. In the left part of the (convex) labour demand curve, the negative slope is steeper.  
  14By reducing the wage adjustment at the margin wage compression increases the adjustment of 
employment, while labour adjustment restrictions dampen job creation and job destruction. 
Hence, the effect on the job flows is ambiguous. The presence of high firing costs may also 
reinforce the preference for rigid wage regimes (Boeri and Burda 2004). Firing costs are 
combined with renegotiation costs in their model, further increasing the utility of rigid wage 
for workers who keep their jobs. Different policies can indeed have offsetting effects on the 
observed job flows. 
Focusing on how collective bargaining systems (bargaining level, coordination, and 
corporatist institutional arrangements) influence macroeconomic performance in 
industrialized countries, Flanagan (1999) concludes that complementarities between key 
institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important 
for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions.  
Belot and Van Ours (2001, 2004) find empirical support to the view that institutions 
strongly affect performance only when their effects on employment reinforce with each other. 
The generosity of unemployment benefits reduces both the unemployment and the 
employment rate which of course implies a decline in the participation rate. The existence of a 
positive interaction between labour taxes and the replacement rate suggests that different 
combinations of the replacement rate and of labour tax rate are consistent with the same 
unemployment rate. The effects of employment protection on the unemployment rate vary 
according to the bargaining level: they are negative when wages are set at the firm level, 
positive when bargaining is at the industry level and insignificant when wages are set at the 
national level. Similarly, union density raises unemployment only in decentralised bargaining 
systems. However, these effects become insignificant when time and country effects are 
included in their regression, implying that that the relationship between performance and 
labour market institutions reflects more fixed differences between countries and time periods 
than within country changes in institutions
11. The presence of complementarities makes 
difficult to predict a priori the response of equilibrium employment to changes in the 
institutional variables, the overall effect on employment and unemployment depending on 
how the behaviour of rent seeking agents (i.e. their bargaining position) and on the existing 
feedbacks between wages and employment are influenced by such complementarities.  
                                                 
11 Likewise, Mourre (2006) finds that the significance of the interactions between labour market institutions does 
not appear robust to the specification chosen (logarithm of total employment versus employment rate), except for 
the joint negative effect of total labour taxes and unionisation. 
  153.4 Limitation of the "macroeconomic" point of view  
Taken together, these studies suggest that labour market institutions can explain a 
significant share of cross-country differences in labour market performance. Changes in 
institutions alone, however, do not explain all the evolution of unemployment over time. Time 
varying institutions, particularly when interacted with macro-economic shocks, explain more 
cross-country differences in unemployment rates than the within-country evolution of the 
unemployment rate. 
The macroeconomic studies considered do not reach a complete consensus on the role of 
each labour market institution and the way they interact between each other and with shocks. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given the different specifications and methodologies employed, 
the scope for omitted variables (including theoretically important institutional aspects, such as 
enforcement of benefit eligibility criteria, on which there are few data).
12 Moreover, the 
econometric estimations using macro indicators of labour market institutions tend not to be 
robust, as the latter embed various institutional aspects and mechanisms, which cannot be 
disentangled, i.e. there is a degree of measurement error in the variables usually available to 
proxy policy-induced changes. The role played by interactions between institutions suggests 
that certain institutional configurations can potentially compensate for the negative effects of 
each institution taken in isolation.  
The fact that labour market institutions are multidimensional makes difficult to identify in 
aggregate panel regressions the impact on unemployment of interactions between all different 
policies, all institutions and all shocks (Flanagan 1999, Baker et al. 2004, Blanchard 2005, 
Freeman 2005).  
While labour market performance is clearly influenced by the mismatch between 
institutions and the economic structure (Buti et al. 1998, Boeri 2003), the link between 
institutions and performance is certainly not stable over time. The increased degree of 
competition in the product markets (Boeri 2003) and the nature of technological progress 
have changed the labour market response to pre-existing labour market institutions 
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1999c). In a context of redistributional conflict between employers 
and employees, labour market institutions that maximise social welfare when markets are 
relatively closed turn out to be too costly in terms of employment loss when markets become 
                                                 
12 See for example Houmann et al. (2005). 
  16more exposed to the international competition. (Bertola and Boeri 2002, Bertola 2004).  
When the change in the structure of production requires less wage compression to 
improve the relative employment performance of groups exposed to higher risks of labour 
market exclusion, institutions justified by insurance arguments may not be anymore welfare 
improving. As economic interactions between institutional arrangements and agents’ 
preferences are potentially substantial, the role of policy design, at both the macro and the 
micro level, appears crucial to achieve the objective of a well functioning labour market. The 
following two sections analyses the design of the labour market institutions at both macro 
level, as a key factor for their adjustment to changing environment/needs and their efficiency.  
 
4.  THE POLICY DESIGN AT THE MACRO-LEVEL: BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY 
PACKAGING 
The policy design at the macro-level covers two main issues. The first concerns the 
quality of industrial relations, in particular the trade-off between all encompassing labour 
unions and firm level bargaining. The second deals with the efficiency of reform package, as 
opposed to single policy measure.  
4.1 Bargaining institutions and wage setting: is decentralised bargaining better? 
At the macro level, a well functioning labour market should contribute to increasing the 
rate of participation and employment, while reducing the rate of unemployment consistent 
with a stable inflation rate. Growth- and stability-oriented macroeconomic policies can 
effectively be supported by a wage-formation mechanism which sets wage growth in line with 
price stability and productivity developments.  
The wage-formation mechanism is characterised by different levels of bargaining. 
Theoretical analyses and empirical testing have shown how both centralised (at national or 
multi-industry level) and decentralised (at the level of firms) bargaining systems perform 
better than intermediate ones (at the level of industries), as the co-operative behaviour of the 
former creates incentives to moderate wage claims, while market forces restrain wages when 
bargaining occurs at the plant level. The hump-shaped relationship between bargaining 
centralization and wage outcomes (Calmfors and Driffill,1988), derives from a negative 
externality of high wages on employment which is internalised only when bargaining is at the 
firm or at the macro level. Conversely, when bargaining is at the intermediate level (say 
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assessed as industry unions consider that the cost of excessive wage settlements could be 
transferred onto other sectors. The internalisation of this externality reduces the aggregate 
wage pressure and improves labour market performance.   
Anything affecting the capacity of internalising the costs of excessive wages/labour costs 
changes the shape of the relationship between macroeconomic performance and degree of 
centralisation/cooperation of bargaining. For example, Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that 
with increased competition arising from higher economic integration, the hump-shaped 
pattern flattens out, implying that the extent of bargaining centralization matters less. Yet the 
post-integration wage-price structure is closer to the configuration prevailing in decentralized 
economies, which make more difficult for economies characterized by centralized wage 
bargaining to adjust to more competitive environment. With strong externalities across 
industries, the hump shaped relationship between bargaining co-ordination and macro-
economic outcomes becomes downward-sloped: the level of wages decline with the level of 
centralisation of bargaining. The level of employment rises with the level of centralisation/co-
ordination along a negatively sloped employment-wages relationship (Calmfors 1993).  
The relationship becomes linear when the influence of unions in the political process 
determining labour taxation and its structure is considered. Unions can be assimilated to large 
encompassing coalitions recognising the link between taxes paid and benefits received. In 
Gruber et al. (1993) wage bargaining affects performance through a fiscal externality. 
Centralised unions look through the budget, and internalise the effect of their wage claims on 
the tax base and on the provision of public goods that enter into the union utility function: 
labour taxation is higher but less distorting. Thus centralised unions recognise that too high 
wage claims lead to a drop in employment, in the tax base and, ultimately, in the provision of 
public goods. The wage moderation effect of public good is higher, the higher the marginal 
utility from public good is (Kilponen and Sinko (2003)).  
Teulings and Hartog (1998) also point out the important role that corporatism (i.e. 
centralised and economy-wide bargaining or institutionalised coordination in the wage-setting 
process) could play in the adjustment of wages to macroeconomic shocks. Following an 
aggregate shock, it would be optimal to adjust nominal wages, although this could not be 
achieved between a firm and a trade union, since they set wages every year at most so as to 
avoid frequent negotiations and ensure stability. In such context, corporatist organisations, 
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interfering with the idiosyncratic relationship between trade unions and individual firms. 
Much more uncertain is the relative performance of a highly centralised bargaining 
compared with a purely decentralised bargaining. The evidence on OECD countries (Boeri et 
al. 2001) suggests that, while levels of co-ordination account more for cross-country 
differences in the unemployment rates than union density and bargaining coverage, high co-
ordination tends to be associated with lower unemployment than decentralised bargaining. 
However, because of either wage floors or minimum wages, coordinated bargaining also 
entails greater compression at the bottom of the wage distribution (Blau and Kahn 1996), with 
negative effects on relative employment of low-wage earners. Blau and Kahn (2000) confirm 
that bargaining institutions compress the wage distribution and raise the relative wage of 
specific socio-economic groups (young men, young women, less-educated men, less educated 
women), which results, especially for men, in lower relative employment, while in the case of 
women the higher relative wages raise the employment rate by stimulating labour supply. The 
wage compression also modifies the industry distribution of employment shifting employment 
away from industries with low wages (Davis and Henrekson 2000) and widens the existing 
regional disparities. In contrast, decentralised bargaining allows for higher relative wage 
flexibility, leaves wider room for bargaining on issues such as pay, working time, and 
working condition. It also makes possible the introduction within firms of performance-
related pay schemes, where wage rises are used to motivate and improve workers’ 
productivity.  
In practice, it is not clear whether the balance of advantages and disadvantages is in 
favour of highly centralised or purely decentralised bargaining, partly because bargaining 
often takes place at two levels, which blurs the distinction between centralised and 
decentralised wage settings. Traxler et al. (2001) do not detect any robust association between 
bargaining centralisation and performance and questioned the explanatory power of 
centralisation  per se. The reason is that many studies fail to systematically differentiate 
between centralization and coordination, tending thus to ignore decentralized forms of 
coordination. This is a major theoretical flaw, since it is coordination that constitutes the 
capacity for internalizing wage externalities. Indeed, the commonly agreed trend towards 
bargaining decentralization hides two different patterns. While many countries moved to 
uncoordinated bargaining on the basis of fully decentralized and single-employer settlements, 
  19others have retained multi-employer bargaining at the central or industry level while leaning 
toward “organized” decentralisation. “Organized or co-ordinated decentralisation” or two-tier 
bargaining can be seen as an endeavour to meet the conflicting demand for decentralisation 
and coordination of bargaining, especially in countries where multi-employer bargaining 
settlements prevail (Traxler et al. 2001 and 2003). Unlike single-employer bargaining, multi-
employer settlements could on their own impact the main macroeconomic variables such as 
employment and inflation, which give strong incentives for all bargaining actors to seek 
cooperation with one another.  
The relative merit of centralisation, “organised” decentralisation and uncoordinated 
decentralisation should be appraised with respect to the double objective of macroeconomic 
stability and microeconomic flexibility. On the one hand, centralisation delivers wage 
restraint and relative wage rigidity, on the other hand, uncoordinated decentralisation favours 
relative wage flexibility and discourages wage moderation (Calmfors 1993). In the context of 
a monetary union and to reduce regional disparities, a gradual shift from centralised towards 
more decentralised bargaining is clearly desirable, perhaps with an adequate mix of both 
systems. For example, a two-tier system (“organised” decentralisation”) that establishes at the 
central level the framework of labour regulation and the growth rate of wage compatible with 
price stability, leaving at the decentralised level room for bargaining according to local or 
sectoral conditions can replicate the positive aspects of both and be welfare improving.  
A last point is that the impact of institutions cannot only be discussed in terms of the 
level and co-ordination of bargaining. Union membership and its decline observed in many 
countries can undermine the effect of centralised bargaining, especially when a large fraction 
of workers is non-unionised. The Workplace employee relations survey of 1998 (WERS98) 
data suggests the wage of many non-union workers is set at the decentralised level of the firm 
(Schnabel et al. 2005).  
4.2 Broadening the reform package? 
As argued in the previous section, the presence of an opportunistic behaviour may give 
rise to a status-quo bias which will keep inefficient institutions from changing. Moreover, 
because of the general uncertainty on the costs and benefits of reform, different socio-
economic groups could be engaged in a war of attrition - it takes time for each part to learn 
about the costs that the other can bear and the conflict can be brought to a standstill - which 
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distributive effects (i.e. they are expected to favour certain socio-economic groups at the 
expense of others), uncertainty about who will gain from reform can prevent its adoption 
when the winners cannot commit to compensating ex-post the losers (Fernandez and Rodrick 
1990).  
An institutional framework that can handle these redistribution problems may enhance 
the cooperation between social partners and government and develop a sense of trust which 
makes reforms process credible. Under these circumstances, the packaging of reforms and a 
framework which promote cooperation may make reforms politically feasible. By exploiting 
the interactions between institutions, a strategy where different measures are part of a long 
term policy package can make reforms viable in the long term. Coordination may be achieved 
either by formal contacts between the social partners and the government or by the 
government incorporating ex-post the practices developed by the social partners in the 
collective agreements.   
However, a broad reform strategy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a reform 
process to be viable. When there is an uncertainty on the transition cost of comprehensive 
reforms, the high reversal costs that are perceived by the agents may make ex-ante the reform 
unfeasible. In contrast, a gradual approach may make reforms feasible by reducing the costs 
of trial and error and by creating the constituencies for continuing the reform (Dewatripont 





5.  THE DETAILKED POLICY DESIGN AT THE MICRO-LEVEL 
This section analyses the importance of the policy design at the micro-level, which 
should first take due account of the trade-off between efficiency and equity, which is likely to 
occur in many (but not all) instances. Then three key guidelines for a better design of 
incentives at the micro level have been identified by an abundant literature in economics and 
political sciences. These key principles are the proper exploitation of incentives, the need for 
targeting and the adequate functioning of institutions in charge of implementing labour 
market policies. These principles should apply independently of country-specific 
characteristics.  
  215.1 The trade off efficiency/equity: does it exist in all cases? 
At the micro level, a well functioning labour market requires reforms that price in 
workers with low labour market attachment and improve the matching between 
unemployment and vacancies. A well functioning labour market should also be inclusive, i.e. 
reduce the risks of marginalisation and of long-term unemployment. This is also the level 
where labour market policies meet social policies. The debate on the reform of the European 
labour market has been flawed by the perception that there is always an inescapable trade-off 
between equity and efficiency, as if European countries were at any time on the efficiency 
frontier.  
Although the management of taxes and transfers entail administration and deadweight 
costs and risks of “welfare dependency”, one can envisage situations where policy design 
reduces the leakage that society has to endure in order to achieve efficient social policies. 
When the proportion of governments’ budgets going to non-redistributive purposes is high 
and the levels of redistributive taxation low, there are policy situations that produce greater 
equity without major efficiency trade-off and there can be even complementarities between 
equity and efficiency. The costs in terms of efficiency loss of transfers are likely to be small 
when they go to segment of the population with no capacity of changing their behaviour, 
when benefits are paid conditional to behavioural requirements or when payments change the 
behaviour or the opportunities in such a way that increase income in the future (Blank 2001). 
While the first condition holds only in the case of social policies stricto sensu (e.g. policies 
dealing with poverty), the others are clearly relevant for the labour market policies. This 
brings attention to the role of effective designing of policies at the micro level.  
5.2 The importance of financial incentives to work and of their profile over time 
The experience of successful reforms highlights the role played by incentives (Madsen 
1998, Van Ours 2003, De Koning et al. 2004, Blundell 2004). Successful reforms are 
generally based on the combination of carrot and stick. The carrot could be time-decreasing 
unemployment benefits to encourage active job-search or setting up financial incentive – net 
income gains - to take up a job or get to the labour force through for instance the provision of 
in-work benefits. Financial incentives, which are the reverse of the marginal effective tax rate 
borne when taking up a job or increasing the work effort, influence the labour supply decision 
(Carone 2005). For instance, taking up a job is often associated with the loss of 
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means-tested benefits (e.g. family or housing benefits). The tax and benefit system should be 
reformed together so as to remove the various incentives to remain unemployed, inactive and 
in low-paid jobs.  
By reducing the relative gain of activity compared with inactivity, disincentives to work 
could prevent from actively seeking a job. For instance, unemployment benefits raise the 
reservation wages and discourage job search. Since job-search effort cannot fully be observed, 
unemployment benefits are subject to moral hazard. The increase in workers’ fall-back utility 
in the case that a hiring contract is not concluded reduces the cost of unemployment from 
employees’ viewpoint and increases wage pressures. In equilibrium, unemployment rises and 
employment falls. Reducing the level of unemployment benefits may increase the financial 
incentives to work. 
The time profile of benefits is generally more important than their initial level to avoid 
benefit dependency and risk of long-term unemployment. In search models, under the 
assumptions of risk adverse agents and no (or low) unemployment benefits, the unemployed 
are likely to accept jobs even though, at the market interest rate, further search would be 
rewarding in terms of jobs with higher productivity and wages. This may be due to capital 
markets imperfections. In such a context and with risk neutral workers, unemployment 
benefits act as a subsidy that finances consumption during search, encourages further search 
and improves the allocation of resources
13. Making unemployment benefits decline over 
periods of increasing unemployment spells is a key condition for encouraging one's taking up 
a job, while providing good initial conditions for an efficient job search without unnecessary 
haste. As the human capital is depreciated over time, the incentive to take up a job depends 
crucial on the decline of the replacement rate over time. This theoretical effect is broadly 
confirmed by the recent empirical literature (Bassanini and Duval 2006), which shows that the 
                                                 
13 Unemployment benefits also influence the composition of jobs created. In Acemoglu and Shimer (1999 and 
2000) risk-averse workers are ready to accept lower wages in return of higher employment probability. Firms 
respond creating jobs with low risk and low wages. In equilibrium the labour market is characterised by too low-
productivity, low-wage jobs. This allocation can be improved by a moderate increase in the unemployment 
benefits from low levels. This increase reduces the distortions created by uninsurable risks and improves the 
matching. In this case, unemployment benefits do not work as a search subsidy but as a way to deal with 
imperfect insurance. The increase in unemployment benefits reduces employment and improves productivity. 
Matching frictions and incomplete insurance are necessary conditions to get these results. In Acemoglu (2001) 
unemployment benefits and minimum wages increase labour productivity because they shift employment toward 
more capital intensive good (i.e. high wage) jobs. These institutions, may improve welfare by encouraging 
workers to wait for high wage jobs.  
  23initial replacement rate of unemployment benefits tend to matter less than the unemployment 
benefit replacement rate observed after 6 months and after one year. 
5.3 The role of non-incentive to work: conditionality, monitoring, sanctions and search 
assistance  
The financial incentives to work ("carrot") should also be completed with non-financial 
incentives ("stick") to solve the problems of free-riding and moral hazard. The stick could be 
a set of credible sanctions, in particular eligibility rules set for having access to or keeping the 
benefits (e.g. employment record needed to have access to benefits, waiting periods before 
unemployment benefits are paid out), the regular control of eligibility conditions (e.g. 
obligation to accept job offers or to enrol in training) accompanied by the removal of 
unemployment benefits in case of non compliance. The threat of loosing benefits if an 
employment offer is not accepted tends to raise the incentive to find a job (Jensen, Rosholm 
and Svarer 2003). There is increasing empirical evidence (e.g. Hasselpflug 2005, Andersen 
2008) that making the payment of unemployment benefits strictly conditional upon 
complying with eligibility rules, work-availability conditions and job-search requirements, 
can offset the disincentive effects linked to these scheme and have a stronger impact on the 
decision to work than the level of benefits in itself.  
Since monitoring usually takes place through the public employment services, the quality 
of services provided by the employment offices and the development of adequate synergies 
between the unemployment benefit providers and the public employment services are central 
to ensuring the enforcement of the job-search criterion.
14 (Carone and Salomaki 2005, 
Andersen 2008
15). The provision of unemployment benefits or other form of assistance 
should be conditional on job search and participation in job placement programs. Policies to 
increase the incentive to stay and enter into the labour market should build upon both active 
measures (raising the employability of job seekers) and passive measures (reducing the 
disincentive to work embedded in the benefit systems).  
                                                 
14  In fact, those countries where substantial welfare reform programmes were adopted in recent years, the modernisation of the 
unemployment benefit system regularly involved the development of strong complementarities between passive and active policies and the 
setting-up of close synergies between the unemployment benefits administration and the Public employment services. 
15 Andersen shows that taxes can be made less distortionary if the tax-benefits system is designed in such a way to re-establish the right 
balance between insurance and incentives. The employment conditionality is working as a tax that reduces the congestion costs (e.g. created 
by cuing in front of the employment offices to claim unemployment benefits). Yet activation does not necessarily lessen the revenue 
requirements of the government. It does only if the direct costs of the conditionalities are more than offset by their effect on the reservation 
wage. Obviously this requires a high reservation wage, i.e. a generous welfare state.  
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the role of non-financial incentives to work. In the framework of the New Deal for Young 
People in the UK, those participating in the programme have to go through a “Gateway” 
period, when they are assigned a “personal advisor”, before being eligible to benefit from 
subsidised training, subsidised private job or a job in the public sector. Participation in the 
programme is mandatory and those refusing to participate could lose their entitlement to the 
benefits. The evidence suggests that during this period, 40% of those going through the 
Gateway moved into unsubsidised jobs, 13% into subsidised employment, 30% into training 
or in job offered by the voluntary sector or by the Environmental task force (Bell et al. 1999). 
More generally, a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most 
effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction, 
allowing for higher benefits than otherwise (Fredriksson and Holmlund 2004). The experience 
of the Netherlands, where the conditions to claim benefits under the disability scheme have 
gradually been tightened, is also interesting. In the 1990s, the disability insurance premium 
was experience rated, the duration of benefits was limited to five years after which a re-
examination had to take place and the disability examination no longer took the availability of 
suitable jobs with respect to education and previous occupation into consideration (Nickell 
and van Ours 2000). More recently employers and employees bear more responsibility for 
inflow of workers into disability (Van Ours 2003).  
5.4 The need of targeting active policies towards groups at higher risks 
When surveying the economic literature, the results based on aggregate data on ALMPs 
turn out to be not very robust either and display a low level of statistical significance. 
Scarpetta (1996) confirms that some ALMPs, such as job assistance, training programs and 
financial assistance for firm creation can stimulate employment. Nevertheless, Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman (1991) emphasise that the composition of spending is as important as the 
level. Moreover, as pointed out by Decressin et al (2001), ALMPs tend to be ineffective when 
they are not focused on well-defined beneficiaries. For example, broadly based employment 
subsidies may have little effect relative to the level of expenditures, that is, high costs per net 
job creation because of dead-weight losses or substitution effects detrimental to non-
subsidised employment (displacement effect). The creation of employment in public 
administration appears even more costly by crowding out employment in the private sector 
due to the rise in labour taxes and wage pressures (Algan et al. 2002). 
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participation behaviour of groups with low labour market attachment (women, older workers, 
low skilled). This occurred when activation measures to tighten the eligibility conditions of 
unemployment benefits were combined with targeted measures directed towards groups at 
higher risks of inactivity or unemployment (De Koning et al. 2004, Van Ours 2003, Madsen 
1998). For example, hiring subsidies to employers tend to be effective when targeted to 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. long-term unemployed), generating limited displacement and 
deadweight effects. This seems to be also the case for direct job creation and training 
measures.  
When efficiently designed and targeted to those with low re-employment probabilities 
such as the long-term unemployed, these programmes improve the match and reduce the risks 
of dropping out of the labour force. By increasing the competition from the unemployed, 
ALMPs keep up the number of job seekers which contributes to wage restraint. This effect is 
expected to raise employment. However, since improved employment prospects reduce the 
perceived cost of non-employment, ALMPs also create an externality in wage setting which 
reduces the incentives for wage restraint with negative effects on employment performance. 
5.5 The good functioning of institutions in charge of implementing labour market 
policies  
Besides the quality of the design based on effectiveness or efficiency, a major problem of 
implementation arises. Taking the current example of “Hartz” packages in Germany, Fertig 
and Kluve (2004) stress the importance of the policy implementation and of the quality of 
administrative instruments when evaluating comprehensive labour market reforms.  
The functioning of policy-implementing institutions can be a substantial factor of 
success. For instance, the adaptation of policy bodies to local conditions (decentralisation) 
and the participation of civil society and business (partnership) and the appropriate number of 
well-trained and qualified staff may be as useful as the policy definition on paper (OECD 
2003). The lack of synergy between institutions can jeopardise the policy efficiency. An 
example is the absence of cooperation in many countries between the public placement 
agency and the unemployment benefit bodies. Moreover, the active job search assistance 
cannot properly work if the staff of public placement agency is performing purely 
administrative tasks (jobless recording and accounting) and has no knowledge of the labour 
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and assist the job seekers. It can also be considered whether private placement companies 
could be used as a complement of public agencies.  
 
6.  ANALYSING REFORMS IN THE EMU  
Increased economic ‘turbulence’, globalisation, skill-biased technological change and 
demographic developments call in question the design of existing labour market institutions. 
With increasing competitive pressures, the lack of reforms raises the efficiency losses induced 
by the labour market institutions that only are motivated by distributional concerns (Bertola 
and Boeri, 2003). The need for labour market reforms was widely acknowledged, especially 
in the case of countries joining the EMU. The membership of the euro area makes a greater 
demand for adjustment capacity, since domestic monetary instruments (i.e. national monetary 
policy and exchange rate adjustment) are no longer available, while the creation of a common 
currency may increase the competition and regional specialisation and thus the frequency of 
asymmetric shocks. In the EMU labour market flexibility becomes a major channel of 
adjustment. The section first analyses the nature of the labour market reforms before and after 
the creation of the euro in 1999. It also estimates a panel data model to identify the effect of 
the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of fragile groups on both 
employment and labour market adjustment to economic developments.  
6.1 Brief descriptive analysis of reforms before and after the EMU  
Data from the FRDB
16 suggest that the advent of the third stage of EMU in 1999 did not 
coincide with an acceleration of labour market reforms, but with a continuation of existing 
reform strategy characterised by a sequence of small changes (incremental reforms), broadly 
heading towards a more flexible labour market. In the early years of EMU there was an 
increase in the number of marginal reforms implemented in all areas except pensions systems 
(Figure 5 – left panel). The reform process was characterised by a sequence of marginal 
reforms rather than by few radical changes, partly confirming the view that euro-area 
membership reduces the incentives for large-scale labour market reforms (Bentolila and Saint 
Paul, 2001). Yet, the change in the monetary regime did not represent a clear break as 
                                                 
16 The Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti (FRDB) database collects information on reforms of EPL, Non-employment benefits, Pensions and 
Migration) in the EU countries. For each policy area, reforms are categorised as marginal or radical, as well as on the basis of their expected 
effects (increase/ decrease) on: labour market distortions, reward to labour market participation, generosity of pension systems and 
immigration policies. 
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the employment protection legislation were marginal, that is, consisting to increase the 
flexibility "at the margin". As shown in Table 2, euro-area countries experienced a sizeable 
increase in employment after 1998, which took the form of both permanent and temporary 
work positions
17. Conversely, non-euro-area countries experienced an increase in 
employment only thanks to the increase in permanent employment. This different pattern is 
likely to have resulted from the ease of employment protection legislation for workers with a 
temporary contract and may be held responsible for an increasing labour market dualism in 
some euro-area countries.  
                                                
Figure 5 (right panel) displays the number of reforms in the euro area according to their 
broad orientation (improving or hampering the functioning and flexibility of the labour 
market). This figure should not be interpreted prima facie, as the "reform accounting" 
approach remains a coarse descriptive approach which cannot capture the scope and level of 
ambition of a reform. All in all, the launch of the euro area does not substantially change the 
direction of labour market reforms. While the number of flexibility-friendly EPL reforms did 
not change, the number of flexibility-curtailing measures rises after 1999, only reflecting 
reform developments in a limited number of countries
18. Since the launch of the euro area, 
there has been an increase in the number of non-employment benefit reforms aiming at 
rewarding the overall work effort (i.e. removing the financial disincentives to work and the 
dependency to unemployment and social benefits). After 1999, the reforms decreasing the 
generosity of the pensions systems continue to be more numerous than those increasing their 
generosity, although the gap is closing
19. Pension reforms have an impact on labour market 
conditions, as they affect the incentive to stay longer in the labour market and influence older 
worker participation. Finally, reforms that tighten the migration policies are more prevalent, 
although migration-friendly reforms increase as well.  
The effect of euro-area membership can be seen in the cross-country distribution of the 
number of marginal reforms. During the years that preceded the launch of the common 
 
17 Exploring the existence of a break in the standard employment equation for the euro area as a whole, Mourre 
(2006) found robust evidence of a break occurring in 1997, that is, two years before the formation of the euro 
area. This is also confirmed using panel data analysis and country-by-country estimation. 
18 In particular, many reforms have been adopted in Spain since 1999, aiming at reducing the duality of the 
labour market by tightening the regulations and incentives for temporary jobs. 
19 The closing difference between the number of reforms decreasing and increasing the generosity of the pension 
system may partly reflect the fact that many far-reaching reforms were already implemented before 1999 to 
ensure the sustainability of the pension regimes and what was done does not need to be done again. 
  28currency (1995-1998), countries doing more reforms increasing the flexibility of the labour 
market (by loosening the EPL -although at the margin-, by reducing the benefit dependency 
and the generosity of the pension system) were also those that performed relatively better in 
terms of both participation and employment rates (Figure 7). About 60% of the differences in 
the reforms increasing flexibility between 1995 and 1998 were accounted by the diversity in 
the initial levels of the participation rates. Similar patterns can be observed when the cross-
section relationship is between reforms increasing the labour market flexibility and the 
employment rates. By contrast, in the EMU years, i.e. from 1999 onwards, the relationship 
between the reforms increasing flexibility and the level of the participation rate at the 
beginning of stage 3 turns out to much weaker (and negative), seen in Figure 7
20. This may 
suggest a generalisation of labour market reforms across euro area countries. The 
disappearance of the negative correlation would indicate that, unlike the pre-EMU period, 
reforms were also introduced by those countries that need them most. However, these 
correlations are only very coarse evidence and remain mainly illustrative given the small 
number of countries covered. The following subsection carries out proper econometric 
analysis to analyse the impact of reforms on employment and participation. 
6.2 Estimating the impact of labour market reforms on employment and participation 
The effect of labour market reforms enacted during the EMU can be estimated using the 
recent LABREF database
21. An important component of the reform activity undertaken over 
the last years in the Euro-area aimed at improving the labour markets utilisation of those 
groups with low participation rates (i.e. women, older workers, and the low-skilled). By 
easing the labour market access for groups with low labour market attachment, these reforms 
may have contributed to the positive developments in the employment and participation rates. 
The higher flexibility at the margin of the labour market may also have increased the cyclical 
fluctuations of employment and participation.  
                                                 
20 Differences in the overall employment rates at the beginning of the stage 3 account for 45% of all pension 
reforms enhancing the incentives to work introduced after 1999, suggestive of policy makers' effort to increase 
the employment rate of future older workers.  
21 LABREF is an inventory of reforms conceived as a tool to provide comprehensive description of qualitative 
features of the reform process, including the design of enacted reforms, their scope and durability. It focuses on 
selected characteristics of enacted measures and provides information on their expected implementation phase. 
The measures reported refer to information on enacted legislation, as well as other public acts of general scope 
(such as decisions of public authorities or court decisions), including measures that entail changes in the 
regulatory environment or implementation framework of previously adopted reform. The database can be freely 
accessed at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/labref_en.htm. For a description of LABREF 
see European Economy Research Letter Vol. 1, issue 3 November 2007. 
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countries that did or did not a reform and assess their effects. Each policy intervention is 
considered as a discrete event occurred at a specific point in time for each country. The 
difference in outcomes after a certain reform has taken place is compared to the changes in 
outcomes in countries that did not enact any of these reforms. This treatment -control 
comparison- identifies the effect of reforms under the assumption that the employment rate 
would have otherwise followed a similar path in reforming and non-reforming countries.  
The focus of the empirical analysis is on a subset of measures contributing to improving 
the employment of disadvantaged groups (i.e. women, older workers, and the low-skilled). 
These reforms cover changes in the regulatory framework or the fiscal incentives for 
temporary and part-time work, targeted tax cuts for the low-skilled/low-income workers, use 
of employment subsidies and direct job creation schemes and the introduction of in-work-
benefits. The effect on the employment rate of reforms for marginally attached people is 
estimated with the following equation.  
t , i 2 t , i 1 t , i 1 t , i 1 t , i i t , i reforms   * gdp gdp reforms   n ε Δ δ Δ μ β α Δ + + + + = − − − −  
with   employment rate;  gross domestic product;    ,t i n   ,t i gdp   i α country specific fixed effect; 
=1 if a certain reform in the above mentioned fields is observed in country i at time 
t; 0 otherwise. This formulation allows testing whether employment and its cyclical response 
change after the reforms. β and δ capture the differential effect of reforms on respectively the 
employment rate and its cyclical response. If β≠0, reforms influence the average employment 
rate. If δ≠0, reform changes also its response over the cycle. The equation is estimated with 
OLS regression with country fixed effects controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity 
and contemporaneous correlation. To capture the lagged effect of reforms the reform dummy 
is introduced with a one-year lag (and a 2-years lag when interacted with the business cycle to 
avoid multi-colinearity problems).  
t i, reforms
This equation is estimated respectively for the total, female and male employment and 
participation rates both for the full sample of EU25 and EMU countries over the period 2001-
2006 (tables 3 a, b and c). As expected, the change in the employment rate increases with 
GDP growth. The response of employment to GDP, especially for men, is higher for countries 
outside the EMU than for those inside, which is consistent with the euro-area countries having 
relatively more rigid labour markets and with an employment legislation benefiting mainly to 
  30the male breadwinner. According to the estimates in tables 3 a, b and c, countries that have 
made an effort to activate groups at the margin of the labour market have enjoyed better 
employment rate changes. Compared to non-EMU group, the "gain" from reforms is about 
twice as much for the members of EMU, predominantly but not exclusively for men. 
The interaction of the reform dummy with the GDP growth reveals that reforms that have 
improved the level of employment have also promoted its adjustment to shocks. Especially in 
the EMU countries this finding is reflected in the higher elasticity of female employment. The 
same approach is next used to assess if reforms for groups at the margin of the labour market 
have effectively modified the pattern of the participation rates (tables 4 a, b and c). Various 
specifications for the participation rate equation for the EMU and non-EMU countries 
confirm that these reforms have been paying out more in the EMU than in non-EMU 
countries.  
To buttress the robustness of these results, the effect of reforms for marginally attached 
groups has been verified on sectoral data from the KLEMS database on a sample covering 
EU25 countries and 38 sectors (20 industries of manufacturing, 16 of services, construction, 
electricity and water supply). Different specifications confirm that reforms targeted to 
disadvantaged groups (i.e. women, low-skilled and low-income groups) have been paying off 
in EMU countries (Tables 5 a, b and c). According to these estimates, the effect of reforms on 
employment growth is positive and statistically significant and, surprisingly, mainly driven by 
the change of employment in manufacturing (see table 5 b). This difference between 
manufacturing and services may be related to the employment protection legislation being 
effectively more binding in manufacturing, a finding consistent with the evidence that 
regulations are more constraining in industries that require a higher level of reallocation 
(Micco and Pages, 2004)
22. Thus, reforms activating groups of people at the margin of the 
labour market gave firms for which employment protection is more binding the opportunity to 
build up a "buffer stock" of flexible and relatively low paid workers.
23 In services, where the 
demand for adjustment is lower because more sheltered from international competition, the 
                                                 
22 A. Micco and C. Pagés (2004), "Employment Protection and Gross Job Flows: A Differences-in-Differences 
Approach", IADB, WP 508. 
23 These results are also consistent with the so-called honeymoon effect of  two-tier labour market reforms, 
whereby a partial liberalisation was accompanied by a temporary over-manning and decline in productivity 
followed by a gradual decline in employment as the incumbents retire T.Boeri and P. Garibaldi (2007), "Two tier 
reforms of employment protection: a honeymoon effect?",  Economic Journal, 117, F357-F358 . Using a panel 
of 1300 firms between 1995 and 2000, the authors find a sizeable negative effect of temporary contracts on 
changes in productivity at the firm level. 
  31improved labour market opportunities for marginally attached groups may have led to 
substitute temporary with permanent workers. Finally, contrary to the non-EMU sample, 
reforms for marginally attached implied for the emu group an increase in the cyclical response 
of employment growth in services and a decline in manufacturing. This finding is suggestive 
of a differentiated impact of these reforms on employment fluctuations, depending on the 
extent of relocation required by shocks and the degree of market rigidity.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Amongst both policy makers and academics, there is a growing consensus that labour 
market institutions need to be adapted to the changing structure of markets and to the 
accelerating rate of technological progress. Because of the complexity of labour market 
problems, a one-size-fits-all approach is unrealistic and irrelevant. Nevertheless, the selective 
review of the literature in this paper shows that some elements are common to most of the 
successful reform strategies.  
There are a number of key messages for policy makers. The endogenous nature of labour 
market institutions highlighted by the literature has three consequences. First of all, labour 
market institutions cannot on their own be considered as a hindrance to the flexible working 
of the labour market, given their evolving nature. Indeed, their impact and the balance of their 
costs and benefits may change over time: an institution is created to tackle a specific problem 
which exists at a given point in time but may cease to exist thereafter. In short, a good 
institution may turn bad - becoming not only useless but also counterproductive - when 
historical circumstances change. Second, institutions cannot be assessed from a purely 
economic standpoint, as they not only affect economic efficiency but also often serve equity 
or redistributive purposes. They cannot be understood without paying due attention to their 
redistributive and welfare effects. For instance, EPL is more than a mere economic rigidity. It 
is also an unemployment insurance scheme and should be analysed in a broader context with 
proper consideration of the unemployment benefit systems. The redistributive role of 
institutions also means that their political economy dimension (i.e. their support in civil 
society, public opinion and the political class) should not be underestimated when reforms are 
being considered. Third, given the endogeneity of institutions and the need to take into 
account the interactions that they generate amongst themselves and with macroeconomic 
shocks, the literature underlines the crucial role of policy design (e.g. exploiting positive 
  32interactions, setting up efficient implementing institutions and targeting) in ensuring the 
efficiency of labour market institutions. Attention should be paid to both the macroeconomic 
and microeconomic design of institutions. 
The literature has also drawn the lessons of the economic history of the last decades. 
Over recent years, several EU countries have started to change their labour market institutions 
in a partial way, often introducing reforms that only involved specific segments of the 
workforce. But the experience of the most successful countries suggests that an effective 
reform requires major policy shifts at the macro and micro level. The shifts observed at the 
macro level occurred in the wage setting mechanism, through a redefinition in rules, norms 
and nature of contractual arrangements, and in the characteristics of policies designed to 
protect workers from labour demand shocks (e.g. EPL or unemployment insurance schemes). 
At the micro level the successful changes to these institutions were generally achieved by 
ensuring the right combination of measures: unemployment benefits available for a short 
period of time or decreasing over time coupled with an active role for public employment 
services (e.g. efficient and individualised job search advice, targeted training programmes, 
timely information on vacancies and job seekers) and complemented with a range of measures 
targeted at those unable to find a job (e.g. retraining, literacy courses, traineeships). Policy 
makers have indeed been increasingly sensitive to the pivotal role of financial and non-
financial incentives to work as a means to raise labour supply in Europe. 
Expectations that the creation of the euro area and the participation in the third stage of 
EMU would prompt radical labour market reforms have not materialised. Nonetheless, the 
reforms enacted within the euro area aimed at increasing labour utilisation, especially of those 
groups with low participation rates, also called the outsiders (i.e. women, older workers and 
low-paid/low skilled workers). In addition, the reforms enacted to improve the labour market 
flexibility focused mainly on the very same outsiders, while only minor policy interventions 
were geared to the needs of adapting employment regulation for insiders. The chronology of 
reforms from the LABREF database has been used to verify whether this configuration of 
reforms has led to a change both in the average employment and participation rates and their 
response to output variation. It turns out that action in this area has been paying off in terms 
of both average rates and their response to shocks. However, these improvements have often 
occurred at the costs of an increased duality of the labour market. 
  33References 
Acemoglu, K.D. (2001) Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.19, 
pp.1-22. 
Acemoglu, K. D. (2005) Institution as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 
Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (eds) Handbook of Economic Growth. North-Holland: Elsevier. 
Acemoglu, K. D. and Shimer, R. (1999) Efficient Unemployment insurance, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.107, pp.893-928. 
Acemoglu, K. D. and Shimer, R. (2000) Productivity gains from unemployment insurance, 
European Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 1195-1224. 
Agell, J (2002) On the Determinants of labour market institutions: Rent seeking versus social 
Insurance, German Economic Review Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 107-135. 
Andersen, T. M., Holmström B., Honkapohja S., Korman S.; Söderström H., Vartiainen J. 
(2007) The Nordic model : embracing globalization and sharing risks. ETLA  
Andersen T. M. (2008) Taxes and employment - is there a Scandinavia puzzle? European 
Commission Economic Papers n°359, Brussels. 
Arpaia A., Costello D., Mourre G. and Pierini F. (2005) Tracking Labour Market Reforms in 
the EU Member States: an Overview of reforms in 2004 based on the LABREF database, 
ECFIN Economic Paper No. 238. 
Baker, D. Glyn, A., Howell, and D. Schmidt, J. (2004) Labour market institutions and 
unemployment in D.Howell (ed.) Questioning liberalisation: Unemployment, Labor markets, 
and the Welfare State, OUP. 
Bassanini, A. and Duval R. (2006). Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing 
the Role of Policies and Institutions, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 486, 
OECD Economics Department 
Bell, B. Blundell, R. and Van Reenen, J. (1999) Getting the Unemployed Back to Work: The 
role of targeted Wage subsidies IFS WP99/12. 
Belot, M. and J.C. Van Ours (2001) Unemployment and labor market institutions: an 
empirical analysis, CentER DP  no. 50. 
Belot, M. and J.C. Van Ours (2004) Does the recent success of some OECD countries in 
lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labour market reforms?, 
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 621-642.  
Benabou R. (2000) Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract, American 
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1) pages 96-129.  
Bertola, G. (2004) A pure theory of Job Security and Labour income Risk Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 71, pp 43-61. 
  34Bertola, G. (2004) Labour Market Institutions in a Changing World forthcoming Moneda y 
Credito. 
Bertola, G. (2004) Distribution, efficiency and labour market regulation in theory, in OECD 
countries, and in Latin America http://www.personalweb.unito.it/Giuseppe.Bertola/. 
Bertola, G., F.D. Blau and L. M. Kahn (2001) Comparative analysis of labour market 
outcomes: lessons for the US from international long-run evidence NBER Working Paper 
8526. 
Bertola, G., F.D. Blau and L. M. Kahn (2002) Labour Market Institutions and Demographic 
Employment Patterns, CEPR Discussion Papers 3448. 
Bertola, G. and W. Koeniger (2004) Consumption smoothing and the structure of labor and 
credit markets, http://www.personalweb.unito.it/Giuseppe.Bertola/. 
Blanchard, O.J. (1986) The Wage Price Spiral, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August, 
1986), pp. 543-565. 
Blanchard, O.J. (1986) The Wage Price Spiral, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August, 
1986), pp. 543-565. 
Blanchard, O.J. (2004) Designing Labour Market Institutions, mimeo. 
Blanchard, O.J. (2005) European unemployment: The evolution of Facts and ideas, MIT WP 
24. 
Blanchard, O.J. and Diamond, P. 1989. The Beveridge curve. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 1, 1–60. 
Blanchard, O.J. and L. Summers (1986) Hysteresis and European Unemployment in Stanley 
Fischer (ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual. MIT Press, Sept., 1986, 15-77. Reprinted in R. 
Cross (ed.), Unemployment, Hysteresis and the Natural Rate Hypothesis. Basil Blackwell, 
1988, pp. 306-364. 
Blanchard, O.J. and J. Wolfers (2000) The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of 
European unemployment: the aggregate evidence, Economic Journal, Vol. 110, 1-33. 
Blanchard, O.J. and Landier, A. (2002) The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: 
Fixed Duration Contracts in France, Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp 214-244. 
Blanchard, O.J. and Giavazzi, F. (2003) The Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and 
Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 pp 879-
90. 
Blanchard, O.J. and Tirole, J (2004) Redesigning the employment protection system, De 
Economist, Vol. 152, pp. 1-20.  
Blank, R. (2002) Can equity and efficiency complement each other? NBER Working Paper 
8820. 
  35Blank, R. and Freeman, R (1993) Evaluating the connection between social protection and 
economic flexibility NBER Working Paper 4338. 
Blau, F. D., and L. M. Kahn (1996) International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: 
Institutions versus Market Forces, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.104, Issue 4, Suppl. 
pp.791-837. 
Blau, F. D. and Kahn L. M. (2000). Gender Differences in Pay, Journal of Economic 
Perspective, American Economic Association, Vol. 14(4) pages 75-99 
Blundell, R. (2004) Labour Market policy and Welfare Reform: Meeting distribution and 
efficiency objectives, De Economist, Vol. 152,2 pp233-250. 
Boeri, T. (2005) Reforming Labour and Product Markets: Some Lessons from Two Decades 
of Experiments in Europe, IMF working Paper/05/97. 
Boeri, T., A. Brugiavini, and L. Calmfors (2001) The role of Unions in the Twenty-First 
Century, OUP. 
Boeri, T, Conde-Ruiz, J.I. and Galasso, V. (2003) Protecting against labour market rise: 
Employment protection or unemployment benefits?, CEPR DP 3990. 
Botero, J., S. Djiankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer (2003) The regulation of 
Labor, NBER Working Paper 9756. 
Buti, M., Pench, L. and Sestito, P. European unemployment: Contending theories and 
institutional complexities, Policy Papers 98/1, Robert Schuman Centre, Florence: EUI. 
Calmfors, L (1993) Centralisation Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance, 
OECD Economic Studies, 21. 
Carone, G. and Salomaki A. (eds) (2005) Indicators and Policies to Make Work Pay. 
Proceedings of the workshop organised by the European Commission (DG ECFIN), 
European Economy, Special Reports No. 2, 2005. European Commission. 
Castanheira, M. and Esfahani, H.S. (2002) Political Economy of Growth: Lessons Learned 
and challenges Ahead in Explaining growth: a global research project, G. McMahon and L. 
Squire ed, International Economics Association:Washington, DC. 
Castanheira, M., Galasso, V., Carcillo, S., Nicoletti, G., Perotti, E. and Tsyganok, L., (2004) 
How to Gain Political Support for Reforms paper presented at the Sixth European 
Conference of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti.   
Checchi, D. and C. Lucifora (2002) Union density. The economic role of unions and 
institutions, Economic Policy, Vol.35, pp 362-408.  
Danthine, J.P. and J. Hunt (1994) Wage bargaining structure, employment and economic 
integration. The Economic Journal, 104 (May), 528-541“.” 
Davis, S. J. and J. C. Haltiwanger (1992). Gross job creation, gross job destruction and 
employment reallocation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 819-63. 
  36Davis, S. J. and J. C. Haltiwanger (1999a). Gross job flows In Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3 (pp. 2711-2805). Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science. 
Davis, S. J. and J. C. Haltiwanger (1999b). On the Driving Forces Behind Cyclical 
Movements in Employment and Job Reallocation, American Economic Review, 89, no. 5, 
1234-1258. 
Davis and Henrekson (2000) Wage-Setting Institutions as Industrial Policy, NBER WP 7502. 
Decressin J., M. Estevão, P. Gerson and C. Klingen (2001) Job-rich growth in Europe. 
Chapter 3 in Selected Euro-Area Countries: Rules-Based Fiscal Policy and Job-Rich Growth 
in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, Country Report No. 01/203, IMF. 
De Koning, J. and H. Mosley (2001) Labour market policy and unemployment. Impact and 
Process evaluation in selected European countries, Edward Elgar. 
Dewatripont, M. and Roland, G. (2005) The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty, 
American Economic Review 85(5) 1207-23.  
Eichengreen, B. and Iversen, T. (1999) Institutions and economic performance: evidence from 
the labour market, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 15 No.4. 
Elmeskov, J., J.P. Martin, and S. Scarpetta (1998) Key lessons for Labour Market Reforms: 
Evidence from OECD Experiences, Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol.5.  
Eriksson, T. (1999) Executive compensation and tournament theory: Empirical tests on 
Danish data, Journal of Labor Economics 17(2), 262{80. 
Estevão, M. (2005) Product Market Regulation and the Benefits of Wage Moderation, IMF 
WP05/191.  
European Commission (2004) Key Determinants of Labour Market Performance in 
Employment in Europe Chapter 2. 
Fertig M. and Kluve J. (2004) A conceptual framework for the evaluation of comprehensive 
labor market policy reforms in Germany, IZA DP No. 1099. 
Fialová, K. and O. Schneider (2008) Labour Market Institutions and Their Effect on Labour 
Market Performance in the New EU Member Countries. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 
2421.  
Fitoussi J.P., Jestaz D., Phelps D. and Zoega E.S. (2000) Roots of the Recent Recoveries: 
Labor Reforms or Private-Sector Forces?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, pp. 
237-312.  
Flanagan, R. (1999) Macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining: an international 
perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (September): 1150-1175. 
Fredriksson P. and Holmlund B. (2004) Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time 
Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?, CESifo WP No. 1019. 
  37Freeman, R. Labour market institutions without blinders: the debate over flexibility and 
labour market performance, NBER WP11286. 
Garibaldi P. and P. Mauro (2002) Employment growth. Accounting for the facts, Economic 
Policy, April. pp. 67-112. 
Gómez Salvador R., Messina J. and Vallanti G. (2004) Gross jobs flows and institutions in 
Europe, ECB working paper series, no.318. 
Gruber, J. (1994) The Consumption smoothing benefit of unemployment insurance NBER 
WP4750. 
Gruber, J, Summers L., and Vergara R. (1992) Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: 
The case of Corporatism, NBER WP4063. 
Haikkila A.and H. Piekkola (2005) Explaining the desire for local bargaining: evidence from 
Finish survey of employers and employees, Labour, 19(2): 399-423. 
Hassler, J., Rodrìguez Mora J.V., Storesletten K. and Zilibotti F. (2001) Unemployment, 
Specialization, and Collective Preferences for Social Insurance in Daniel Cohen, Thomas 
Piketty and Saint-Paul G. (eds) The New Economics of Rising Inequalities, pp. 331-50, OUP, 
2001. 
Hibbs, D. A. and H. Locking, (2000) Wage dispersion and productive efficiency: Evi-dence 
for Sweden, Journal of Labor Economics 18(4), 755{82. 
Houmann, F. Gaard, S. and Bagge Thorball, A. K. (2005) Evaluating labour market reforms 
in Europe in the 1990s in Carone, G. and Salomaki, A. (eds.) Indicators and Policies to make 
work pay, Proceeding of the workshop organised by the European Commission (DG ECFIN)  
Immervoll, H., Levy, H., Lietz, C., Mantovani, M., O'Donoghue, C., Sutherland, H. and 
Verbist, G. (2005) Household Incomes and Redistribution in the European Union: 
Quantifying the Equalising Properties of Taxes and Benefits. IZA DP 1824.  
Jensen,P., Rosholm M. and Svarer M., (2003) The Response of Youth Unemployment to 
Benefits, Incentives, and Sanctions, European Journal of Political Economy 19, 301-316. 
Jimeno, J. and Rodrìguez-Palenzuela D. (2003) Youth Unemployment in the OECD: 
Demographic Shifts, Labour market Institutions, and Macroeconomic Shocks ENEPRI 
Working Paper 19. 
Kahn, L. M. (2000) Wage Inequality, collective bargaining, and relative employment from 
1985 to 1994 The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 82, Issue 4, pp. 546-579. 
Katz H.C. (1993) The decentralization of collective bargaining: a literature review and 
comparative analysis, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 47(1): 3-22. 
Lallemand, T., R. Plasman and F. Rycx (2007) Wage Structure and Firm Productivity in 
Belgium, NBER. Working Paper 12978, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
  38Layard, R. and Nickell, S.J. (1999) ‘Labour Market. Institutions and Economic Performance’, 
in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Amsterdam North-
Holland, Vol. 3E, pp 3029-3084. 
Lazear, E. P. (1989) “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 
561-580. 
Lazear, E. P. et Rosen S. (1981) Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-864. 
Madsen, P. K. (1999)  Denmark: Flexibility, security and labour market success, ILO, 
Employment and Training Papers 53. 
Martins P. (2008) Dispersion in Wage Premiums and Firm Performance, Centre Research, for 
Globalisation Working Paper 8, April (forthcoming in Economics Letters). 
Mortensen D. and Pissarides C. (1999a). Job Reallocation, Employment Fluctuations, and 
Unemployment,” Chapter 18 in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (eds.), Handbook of 
Macroeconomics Vol. 1B, 1171-1228, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Mortensen D. and Pissarides C. (1999b). New Developments in Models of Search in the 
Labor Market,” Chapter 39 in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor 
Economics Vol. 3B, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Mortensen D. and Pissarides C. (1999c) Unemployment response to skill-biased technology 
shocks: the role of labour market policy. The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, pp. 242-265. 
Mourre G. (2006) Did the pattern of aggregate employment growth change in the euro area in 
the late 1990s?, Applied Economics, 38, 1783-1807, August, Routledge, Warwick. (Available 
also as ECB working paper, no 358, May 2004.) 
Nickell, S. J. (1997) Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe vs North America, 
Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 11(3) pp. 57-74. 
Nickell, S. J. (2002) A picture of European Unemployment: Success and Failure, paper 
prepared for the Jahnsson Foundation-CESifo Conference Unemployment in Europe Reasons 
and Remedies. 
Nickell, S. J. and Van Ours J. C. (2000) The Netherlands and the United Kingdom: a 
European unemployment miracle?, Economic Policy, Vol. 30, pp. 137-175. 
Nickell, S. J., Nunziata L., Ochel W. and Quintini G. (2003) The Beveridge Curve, 
Unemployment and Wages in the OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s. in Aghion, P.; 
Frydman, R.; Stiglitz, J.; Woodford, M. (eds), Knowledge, Information and Expectations in 
Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps, Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Nickell, S. J., Nunziata L. and Ochel W. (2005) Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. 
what do we know, The Economic Journal Vol. 115 pp 1-27.  
OECD (2003) Managing Decentralisation: A New Role for Labour Market Policy. Paris. 
OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, Paris.  
  39Pissarides, C., 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, second edition, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. 2001. Looking into the black box: a survey of the matching 
function. Journal of Economic Literature 39, 390–431. 
Schnabel C., S. Zagelmeyer, S. Kohaut (2006): “Collective bargaining structure and its 
determinants: an empirical analysis with British and German establishment data”, European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(2): 165-188. 
Saint-Paul, G. (2000) "The political economy of labour market institutions", Oxford U. Press. 
Teulings, C.N. and J. Hartog (1998) Corporatism or competition?: labour contracts, 
institutions and wage structures in international comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, UK. 346 p. 
Traxler F., S. Blascke and B. Kittel (2001) National labour relations in internationalized 
market. A comparative study of institutions, change, and performance, Oxford University 
Press, 339p. 
Traxler F., S. Blascke and B. Kittel (2003) Bargaining (De)centralization, Macroeconomic 
Performance and Control over the Employment Relationship, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 41(1), 2003) 
Van Ours, J.C. (2003) Has the Dutch miracle come to an end?, CentER DP no. 32. 
Varian, H.R. (1980) Redistributive taxation as social insurance, Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol. 14, pp. 49-68. 
Wallace H. and Kahn (1982) The determinants of bargaining structure in US manufacturing 
industries, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 35(2): 181-195. 
Winter-Ebmer, R. and J. Zweimüller (1999) Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm 
Performance, Kyklos, 52, 555-572. 
Yashiv, E. (2006). Evaluating the performance of the search and matching model. European 
Economic Review, 50:909–936. 
Yashiv, E. (2007). Search and matching in macroeconomics. European Economic Review. 
forthcoming. 
 
  40ANNEX: FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1 















Semi-interquartile range normalised by simple average (3 per. Mov. Avg.; right scale)
Unemployment rate 3 per. Mov. avg.
Coefficient of variation 3 per. Mov.Avg
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Source: Authors’ calculation on the OECD Social Expenditure database and Labour Market database. Unemployment benefits are 
calculated as the expenditure on unemployment benefits per unemployed as percentage of the GDP per capita. Luxembourg excluded due to 
data availability. 
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Note: on the vertical axis overall index of strictness of EPL. The horizontal axis reports the difference between the Gini coefficients of 
income before and after tax and benefits, excluding pensions: a high absolute value of this difference means that the tax and benefit system 
alter the income structure toward more equality.  
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Direction of labour market refroms in the euro area
Source: Commission services based on FRDB data base. The left panel shows the distribution of reforms according to whether they are 
structural or marginal. The right panel shows the distribution of reforms based on whether they increase/decrease labour market flexibility; 
increase/decrease reward from work; increase/decrease generosity of the pension system; increase/decrease generosity of immigration 
policies 
Figure 6 –Reforms increasing flexibility (1995-1998) and initial conditions (1995)  
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Source: Commission services based on FRDB and LFS data 
Figure 7 - Reforms increasing labour market flexibility and the reward from work 
(1999-2005) compared with initial employment conditions (1999)  
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Source: Commission services based on FRDB and LFS data. 
 
  43Table 1  The main results of recent studies 
Labour market institutions and Labour market performance 
Study  Countries and Periods  Institutions considered  Results  
Aggregate performance  
Elmeskov et 
al. (1998) 
Static Panel data on 19 
OECD countries over the 
period 1983-1995 (GLS 
random effects).  
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMPU) 
EPL 
 
Minimum wage (MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation (CO) 
 
Union density (UD) 
Small positive effects. Positive and significant only 
in countries with intermediate co-ordination  
Positive effects, larger in countries that spend more 
on ALMPS 
Negative effects if Sweden is excluded  
Positive effects. Positive and significant only in 
countries with intermediate co-ordination  
Insignificant effects 
Negative effects in high centralised/co-ordinated and 
decentralised countries 
Insignificant effects 
























Cross Section on 20 OECD 




Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMPU) 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union Coverage (UC) 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on employment rate 




Static Panel data on 20 
OECD countries over the 
period 1960-1995.  
 
Interactions of time fixed 
institutions with TFP, real 
interest rate and labour 
demand shocks  are 
considered with non-linear 
least squares  
Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
 
Spending on ALMPs (ALMP) 
EPL 
 
Minimum wage (MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation 
 
Union density (UD) 
 
Union Coverage (UC) 
Positive effects 
Positive effects. Among most significant when 
interacted with shocks  
Positive effects. Among most significant when 
interacted with shocks 
Positive effects 
Positive effects but weaker when Spain is dropped 
from sample 
Positive effects 
Positive effects. Among most significant when 
interacted with shocks 
Positive effects. Among most significant when 
interacted with shocks 
Insignificant effects 
Fitoussi et al. 
(2000)  
Two steps approach.  
First step: Over the period 
1960-1998 for 19 OECD 
countries, a dynamic panel 
(fixed effects) estimate of 
unemployment persistency 
and sensitivity to macro 
shocks is obtained.  
Second step: Cross section of 
(short- and long-run) fixed 
effects and sensitivity 
coefficients to labour market 
institutions  
Macro-variables: world real interest rate , 
trend labour productivity growth, ratio of 
non wage support to labour productivity, 
direct taxes, payroll taxes, inflation rate 
 
Labour market institutions: Replacement 
rate (GRR), benefit duration (BD), union 
density, (UD) union co-ordination (CO), 
union coverage (UC), active labour 
market expenditure (ALMP) 
At least 50% of cross country differences in 
unemployment and in sensitivity to shocks are 
explained by labour market institutions 
 
 
cross country differences in unemployment are a 
positive function of GRR, UD, CO and a negative of 
UC 
 
cross country differences in sensitivity of shocks are 
a positive function of BD, UD and a negative CO 
and ALMP 
Nickell et al 
(2002) 
Dynamic Panel data on 20 
countries over the period 
1961-1995. (GLS estimates) 
 
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD)  
 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on unemployment rate 
Positive effects. Larger in countries with high 
degree of bargaining co-ordination 
Positive effects. Larger in countries where the 




Positive effects, reduced when co-ordination is 
bargaining is high 
Insignificant effects 
Effects on employment rate 
Similar effects. Only Benefits duration are 
insignificant 
Belot and Van 
Ours  (2004) 
Static Panel data on 17 








Effects on unemployment rate 
Insignificant effects.  
Negative effects. The effect of GRR is larger in 
countries with a high tax rate  
Insignificant. Effect of the interaction with 
centralisation ambiguous  
  44Centralization  
Union density (UD) 




Insignificant effects  
Positive  
Effects on non-employment rate 
Similar results 
Gomez-
Salvador et al 
(2004) 
Static Panel data, (OLS and 





































     
Nickell et al 
(2005) 
Dynamic Panel data on 20 
countries over the period 
1961-1995. (GLS estimates) 
 
Tax wedge (TW) 
 
Gross replacement rate (GRR) 
 




Union density (UD) 
 ΔUnion density (UD) 
Owner Occupation rate 
Effects on unemployment rate 
Positive effects. Larger in countries with high 
degree of bargaining co-ordination 
Positive effects. Larger in countries where the 
duration  of unemployment benefits is high  
Positive effects 
Insignificant effects 
Negative effects, stronger in countries where union 
density is high  
Insignificant 
Positive effects  
Insignificant effects 
Effects on employment rate 
Similar effects. Only Benefits duration are 
insignificant 
Mourre (2006)  Dynamic Panel data (GLS 
estimates) on 10 euro area 
countries and 20 OECD 






Bargaining  Coordination 
Union density 




(Lower) Tax wedge  
(Lower) EPL  
(Higher) Part-time employment rate 
(More) Private employment subsidies 
Unionisation, 
Benefit replacement rate,  
Benefit duration  
Other ALMPs (public employment 
services, labour market training and 
direct job creation in the public 
sector) 
Effect on employment (number of people and rate of 
employment) 
Negative 
Negative (although not very robust) 
Positive 
Negative (but low significance) 
Positive (but low significance) 
Insignificant 
Contribution to the positive break in employment 
pattern in the late 1990s (cross-section) 
Yes 
Yes (but less clear) 
Yes (but less clear) 





2.  Relative performance 
Effect on employment rate of middle- relative to low-
skilled 
Men Women 
Kahn (2000)  Static panel data over the 





Union density (UD) 
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Effect on relative employment rate 
Prime age vs. youth  Prime age vs. older 
 
Men   Women Men Women 
Tax wedge (TW) 
replacement rate year 1 
replacement rate year 5 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union coverage (UC)  
Public pension replac. Rate 
Replac. rate older workers 
Disabil. Replac. rate  
Female retirement age  
Male retirement age  
























































Effect on the relative unemployment rate 
Prime age vs. young   Prime age vs. older 
 




Static Panel data on 
17 OECD countries 
over the period 1960-
1999. (GLS estimates)  
Tax wedge (TW) 
replacement rate year 1 
replacement rate year 5 
EPL 
Co-ordination (CO) 
Union density (UD) 
Union coverage (UC)  
Public pension replac. Rate 
Replac. rate older workers 
Disabil. Replac. rate  
Female retirement age  
Male retirement age  





















































Effect on the relative unemployment rate 











panel data on 19 
OECD countries  
Tax wedge (TW) 
Gross replacement rate 
(GRR) 
Benefits Duration (BD) 
Spending on ALMPs 
(ALMP) 
EPL 
Strictness of temporary 
contracts 
Relative Minimum wage 
(MW) 
Co-ordination/Centralisation 
Union density (UD) 



















































 Table 2: Contribution of temporary and permanent jobs to cumulated employment 
growth ("Diffs-in-Diffs" approach)  
     1991-1998  1999-2006 
Temporary Employment     
EMU   4.07  3.27 
Non-EMU (DK, SE, UK)  2.93  -0.37 
z-test: same mean changes  5.72***  26.19*** 
    
Permanent Employment      
EMU   4.72  7.21 
Non-EMU (DK, SE, UK)  10.8  5.44 
z-test: same mean changes  -12.2***  6.42*** 
Source: Authors' calculations on LFS; non-EMU includes Denmark Sweden and the UK. Columns (1) and (2) report for the EMU and non-
EMU countries the contribution of temporary and permanent contracts to total employment growth. The z-test measures whether the 
cumulated employment growth in the EMU significantly differs from that in the non-EMU countries. The test clearly rejects the null 
hypothesis of similarity of the contribution of temporary and permanent jobs to total employment growth between the EMU and non-EMU 
countries. The sum of the contributions of temporary and permanent employment for respectively EMU and non-EMU group gives the 
cumulated employment growth over each sub-period based on LFS. This can differ from the growth rate based on National Accounts. 
Table 3a: Effect of reforms Total employment rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in Total Employment rate 






















Country Fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.42  0.33  0.48 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The "All 
countries" sample includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2001-2006. 
Table 3b: Effect of reforms Female employment rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in Female Employment rate 






















Country dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.51  0.40  0.27 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The "All 
countries" sample includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2001-2006. 
Table 3c: Effect of reforms Male employment rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in Male Employment rate 






















Country dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.27  0.21  0.36 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The "All 
countries" sample includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2001-2006 
 Table 4a: Effect of reforms Total participation rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in  Total Employment rate 






















Country dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.27  0.19  0.29 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The "All 
countries" sample includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2001-2006 
 
Table 4b: Effect of reforms Female participation rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in Female Employment rate 






















Country dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.40  0.19  0.27 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample 
includes all EU25 countries; Estimation period: 2001-2006 
 
Table 4c: Effect of reforms Male participation rate average and cyclical response 
Dependent variable:  
Change in Male Employment rate 






















Country dummies   Yes  Yes   
Observations   150  72  78 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.06  0.02  0.12 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample 
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Table 5a: Effect of reforms on the growth of Employees  
(average and cyclical response): Total Economy 






















Country–Industry fixed effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   4699  2250  2449 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.54  0.54  0.56 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample 
includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2000-2004 
 
Table 5b: Effect of reforms on the growth of Employees  
(average and cyclical response): Manufacturing  
Dependent variable: employment growth in 
manufacturing  






















Country–Industry fixed effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   2079  990  1089 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.40  0.30  0.48 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample 
includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2000-2004 
 
Table 5c: Effect of reforms on the growth of the Employees (average and 
cyclical response): Services  






















Country–Industry fixed effect    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   2620  1260  1360 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.59  0.63  0.57 
OLS regression controlling for country specific heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Absolute 
values of T-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample 
includes all EU25 countries. Estimation period: 2000-2004 
 